The 7th Games, Agents, and Incentives workshop will be held at AAMAS 2025

This year, we will be wrapping up our workshop with a joint session with the Joint Event For Faculty Retirement celebrating Jeff Rosenschein’s career. This will be held in the same room as GAIW.

Overview

Time Session Topic Structure
8:00-8:30 Registration    
8:30-9:15 Keynote - Haifeng Xu   1 x 45min
9:15-10:00 Session #1 Short Talks Games, Agent-Based Modelling, and Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning 9 x 5min
10:00-10:45 Coffee Break    
10:45-12:00 Session #2 Full Talks Fair Division and Matching 5 x 15min
12:00-12:20 Session #2 Short Talks Fair Division and Matching 4 x 5min
12:30-14:00 Lunch Break    
14:00-14:45 Keynote - Evi Micha   1 x 45min
14:45-15:15 Session #3 Full Talks Voting, Preference Aggregation, and Learning 2 x 15min
15:15-15:40 Session #3 Short Talks Voting, Preference Aggregation, and Learning 5 x 5min
15:45-16:30 Coffee Break    
16:30-17:00 Session #4 Full Talks Normal-Form Games and Cooperative Games 2 x 15min
17:00-17:10 Session #4 Short Talk Normal-Form Games and Cooperative Games 2 x 5min
17:15-18:00 Joint Event for Faculty Retirement Celebrating Jeff Rosenschein’s Career  
18:00-19:00 Opening Reception    

Detailed Schedule

Time Title PDF
8:00-8:30 Registration  
8:30-9:15 Keynote - Haifeng Xu  
  Session #1: Games, Agent-Based Modelling, and Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning  
9:15-9:20 Learning in Conjectural Stackelberg Games PDF
9:20-9:25 Strong Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Bounded Group Size PDF
9:25-9:30 Explicit Exploration for High-Welfare Equilibria in Game-Theoretic Multiagent Reinforcement Learning PDF
9:30-9:35 A Game-Theoretic Deep Reinforcement Learning Approach for Detecting False Data Injection in Routing Algorithms PDF
9:35-9:40 Incentive Design for Rational Agents PDF
9:40-9:45 Scaling Marginal Cost Tolling to Address Heterogeneity under Imperfect Information in Routing Games PDF
9:45-9:50 Networked Communication for Mean-Field Games with Function Approximation and Empirical Population Estimation PDF
9:50-9:55 Wealth vs. Wisdom: How budgets limit information aggregation in prediction markets PDF
9:55-10:00 Adaptive Preference Aggregation PDF
10:00-10:45 Coffee Break  
  Session #2: Fair Division and Matching  
10:45-11:00 Weighted Envy Freeness With Limited Subsidies PDF
11:00-11:15 Online Fair Division: Towards Ex-Post Constant MMS Guarantees PDF
11:15-11:30 Building Auctions from Fair Division Mechanisms PDF
11:30-11:45 Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets PDF
11:45-12:00 Converging to Stability in Two-Sided Bandits: The Case of Unknown Preferences on Both Sides of a Matching Market PDF
12:00-12:05 Fairness and Non-wastefulness in Matching with Siblings and Initial Enrollments PDF
12:05-12:10 Approximating One-Sided and Two-Sided Nash Social Welfare With Capacities PDF
12:10-12:15 Decentralized Fair Division PDF
12:15-12:20 Mechanism-Informed Preference Learning in Fair Division PDF
12:30-14:00 Lunch Break  
14:00-14:45 Keynote - Evi Micha  
14:45-15:00 The Art of Two-Round Voting PDF
15:00-15:15 Truthful Budget Aggregation: Beyond Moving-Phantom Mechanisms PDF
15:15-15:20 Optimizing Viscous Democracy PDF
15:20-15:25 On Condorcet’s Jury Theorem with Abstention PDF
15:25-15:30 Clone-Resistant Weights in Metric Spaces: A Framework for Handling Redundancy Bias PDF
15:30-15:35 Learning to Elect a Committee PDF
15:35-15:40 DeepVoting: Learning Voting Rules with Tailored Embeddings PDF
15:45-16:30 Coffee Break  
16:30-16:45 Deviation Ratings: A General, Clone-Invariant Rating Method PDF
16:45-17:00 Deviation Dynamics in Cardinal Hedonic Games PDF
17:00-17:05 Participation Incentives in Online Cooperative Games PDF
17:05-17:10 Promises Made, Promises Kept: Safe Pareto Improvements via Ex Post Verifiable Commitments PDF
17:15-18:00 Celebrating Jeff Rosenschein’s Career Joint Event for Faculty Retirement
18:00-19:00 Opening Reception